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Abstract. The Torah lays out a rich idea of God’s governance in the Scroll of 
Esther: Circumstance lays the warp, but human choices weave the woof of 
destiny. God remains unseen. Delegation of agency, including human freedom, 
is implicit in the act of creation: God does not clutch efficacy jealously to his 
breast. Biblically, God acts through nature, making the elements his servitors. 
Miracles do not violate God’s covenant with nature. Maimonides, following 
rabbinic homilies, finds them embedded in that covenant. Divine agency is 
clearest today in evolution and its special case, the emergence of autonomy and 
the rise of consciousness and personhood.
The book of Esther stands alone in the Hebrew canon as the one book 
that does not mention God.1 Its record of a  redemptive moment that 
Jews still celebrate joyously as miraculous is framed as a court romance, 
drawing its sense of realism from a  narrative strategy that casts 
a penetrating eye on episodes of palace intrigue, hushed conversations, 
secret plots, private messages, a  sleepless king, a  golden sceptre, royal 
ring and seal, palace chronicles, and rescripts sent by courier throughout 
the polyglot satrapies of a vast empire, foiling a monstrous, genocidal 
plot blown up from pride and pettiness but exploded by the courage of 
a lovely queen and her resourceful uncle and guardian. If God is active 
here, his hand is unseen. The closest Esther’s scroll comes to mentioning 
God is Mordecai’s challenge sent to Esther when she informed him of the 
mortal danger she faced should she approach the king unbidden:
Do not imagine yourself in the palace surviving every Jew. If you keep 
silent now relief and rescue for the Jews will arise elsewhere, but you and 
1  God is mentioned only obliquely in Song of Songs 8:6, where passion is called 
a Godfierce flame – but the rabbinic tradition takes the thought of peace in the name 
Shelomo in the song’s first line as an allusion to God, as the source of all peace.
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your father’s house will perish – And who knows if it was for a time like 
this that you came to royal rank (4:13-14).
Mordecai’s tone takes its edge from the gravity of the crisis. But his trust 
in God’s salvation is hedged in reticence. The danger is real, despite the 
hopes piety musters; and Mordecai does not know what form rescue 
might take. He pointedly reminds his ward of who she is, lest palace life 
has loosed her loyalties. But he speaks cautiously of providence. More 
courtier than theologian, he makes doubt the ally of his argument: Who 
knows if it was for just such a moment that you, of all women, became 
a royal consort. Lots were cast twice, then, in a way: overtly in choosing 
a day on which the Jews of every province were to die; more hiddenly, in 
Esther’s choice as queen.
Facing her moment, Esther asks that her people fast for her – a fast 
still kept. She and her maidens will fast too. Then she will approach the 
king, despite the dictates of prudence – and if I perish, I perish (4:16). 
She does not echo Mordecai’s bluff assurance that somehow God will act 
but makes her choice not knowing if she will be God’s instrument or just 
another victim in the maw of injustice.
Punning in Hebrew on Esther’s Persian name,2 an  eponym of 
Astarte, as her uncle’s was of Marduk, the Talmudic rabbis see hints of 
God’s hiddenness: haster astir panay (Deuteronomy 31:18, quoted at 
Babylonian Talmud Hullin 139b) – I shall surely hide My face... The loss 
of intimacy with God may be the scar of spiritual exile warned of as 
Moses’ warms to his cautionary final song to Israel. But it is also part 
of the human condition. As Roger Scruton writes, drawing on Simone 
Weil’s reflections, ‘God can show himself in this world only by entirely 
withdrawing from it: to appear among us clothed in the divine attributes 
would be to absorb and annihilate what is not God, and so to undo the 
work of creation.... “thou canst not see my face, for there shall be no man 
see me and live” (Exodus 33:20).’3
Isaiah takes up God’s hiddenness when he pictures potentates 
from several nations saying Indeed, You are a  God that hides yourself 
(45:15), but almost in the same breath acknowledging God as the sole 
true divinity, there is no other (45:14). Ibn Ezra (1093-1167) parses that 
double-edged thought: God was hidden, yet active in saving Israel: ‘As 
2 Her Hebrew name was Hadassah (Esther 2:7), a name taken from the fragrant myrtle.
3 Roger Scruton, The Soul of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 
p. 71; cf. p. 10: ‘God reveals himself by concealing himself.’
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the commentators say, although unseen God showed himself for Israel’s 
sake.’4 Like Esther and Mordecai we do not know when or how God will 
act. Unlike them, we often fail to notice just when or how God has acted 
in our lives. That makes the Book of Esther keenly relevant for us.
Esther and Mordecai are not marionettes. Their actions are their 
own. That is part of what it means to say that God created heaven and 
earth and all living creatures: God gives more than bare existence – as if 
anything had bare existence with no character or nature of its own, no 
dispositions or capacities – or, in the human case, no power to choose 
and plot a course.
Esther faced a momentous choice. So, in his way, did Mordecai. He 
needed to think through the options and shoulder risks that others might 
have shirked. The choices of the two would have a  lasting impact on 
Israel, and on the choosers. They were making decisions about who they 
would be. Esther, above all, at her critical moment, became the person 
of her choice. But, despite its prominence, her situation is paradigmatic 
of human choices, even those too close, familiar, or routine to dominate 
awareness for most of us most of the time. God set the stage, just as 
Mordecai proposed, seeing an opportunity in the midst of danger. But 
Esther’s choice was hers.
It’s natural enough to think of divine action as an intervention. When 
reporters appear after a  tornado and press a microphone into the face 
of someone whose home was spared, and drop the formulaic gambit, 
‘What did it feel like when you saw your neighbours’ homes swept away 
and yours was untouched?’ we’re ready for the formulaic answer, ‘I guess 
Somebody up there was looking out for us.’ But how reflective is that? 
Was God ignoring the neighbours? And if God made all things, did He 
not make the storm? Is God active only when a crisis touches us, and 
beseeched or thanked only by asking for nature to change course? That’s 
unreasonable and self-serving. It’s unjust to others and pays scant respect 
to God.
In the Book of Job we overhear God speaking from the storm wind, not 
in the still small voice He used in speaking to Elijah (1 Kings 19:11-13). 
But one still needs to know how to listen. The storm wind is not typically 
an instrument of judgment. It cannot discriminate, as divine judgment 
should – as pictured in the narrative of Noah’s flood. Recall the covenant 
4 Abraham Ibn Ezra, Commentary on Isaiah, ed. by M. Friedlander (London, 1873) 
Hebrew, 2.78; English 1.209; the translation here is mine.
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with nature that follows: seedtime and harvest will endure (Genesis 8:22). 
God will no longer interfere. He knows that human beings incline to evil 
from their youth.
Mordecai’s reticence gives us a hint of something distinctively Jewish 
in his reticence about God’s action in our lives. Beyond that cultural 
caution, Jewish philosophy avoids setting freedom against nature. We 
tend to see human powers of choice as part of nature, not alien to it.5 
Freedom is Godgiven. By the same token, we do not play off nature 
against God in a zero-sum explanatory game, as though natural causes 
somehow excluded divine action, so that the more we know scientifically 
the less room remains for God. On the contrary, the better we understand 
nature’s workings (including those of human minds and souls) the abler 
we are to see and celebrate God’s work.6
If we see God’s work everywhere, as Maimonides says a true monotheist 
will, and regard nature as an expression of God’s wisdom – and nature’s 
bounty as a gift of God’s grace – we gain a sense of miracles everywhere. 
Thus, in an ancient prayer still recited, protesting our inability to thank 
God adequately for one thousandth of His millions of favours, each drop 
of rain is counted among the favours for which we owe God gratitude 
(Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 59b, Ta‘anit 6b).
Clearly rain can be a blessing. And, like any natural occurrence, it can 
also be a trial. Yet a trial too can be made a blessing – much as a poet, 
or creative artist, or inventor makes an  opportunity of a  difficulty. So 
Abraham is blessed when he surmounts his trial when hearing that he 
must offer up his long awaited son (Genesis 22). His crisis leads him to 
discovery of the unity of holiness with love, and its incompatibility with 
violence and violation. The God of monotheism is not the mysterium 
tremendum that beckons wantonly to pagan piety. It is through that 
discovery that Abraham becomes a  blessing to all the nations of the 
earth.7
5  See, inter alia, Maimonides, Mishneh Torah I, Hilkhot Teshuvah V, edited and 
translated by Moses Hyamson (Jerusalem and New York: Feldheim, 1974), pp. 86-88; 
‘Eight Chapters’, 5 and 8, edited and translated by Joseph Gorfinkle (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1903).
6 This thought is developed in Lenn E. Goodman, Creation and Evolution (London: 
Routledge, 2010), especially Chapter 5.
7 See Lenn E. Goodman, God of Abraham, Chapter 1, and Judaism: A Contemporary 
Philosophical Investigation, forthcoming.
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Esther too faces a test, not of faith in the familiar sense. Her trust is 
not that God will reach out and catch her if she falls. Her courage rises 
as she acknowledges that she might die. Her faith is her commitment 
to God’s truth. She manifests it in choosing the nobler act. God set the 
conditions. But it was she who rose to the test – summoning Israel to fast 
with her, to ensure them to be worthy of her risk. God acted, but not by 
disrupting nature’s course. In less momentous crises too, although our 
penchant is to treat our crises as a test of God, it is not God but we who 
are tested, and who need the test, if we are to become the human beings 
we can be.8
To think of miracles as exceptions to nature’s course one must have 
some core idea of nature. So it’s strange to find Leo Strauss arguing, 
‘The Old Testament, whose basic premise may be said to be the implicit 
rejection of philosophy, does not know “nature”: the Hebrew term for 
“nature” is unknown to the Hebrew Bible.’9 But, as Nahmanides (1195-
1270) said, a cow would not notice a miracle if it saw one.
The word Strauss finds missing biblically is the medieval term for 
nature (ṭeva‘), based on the Arabic (ṭabi‘a), a term well attested among 
Arabic translators of Greek works and among philosophers who wrote 
in Arabic.10 The base meaning is to sink, as in the Song of Moses, where 
Pharaoh’s host are sunk in the Sea of Reeds (Exodus 15:4), or David’s 
stone sinks into Goliath’s forehead (1 Samuel 17:49). So the term was 
a  natural choice in medieval philosophy, suggesting the impress or 
stamp of a thing, as in the biblical word for a signet ring (ṭaba‘at). The 
root acquires overtones of the idea of nature when Proverbs speaks of 
mountains sunk as piers anchoring the earth (8:25). In the Psalms (102:26) 
those foundations assure stability: He anchored the earth on its footings, 
never to totter (104:5). Perhaps Strauss missed that thought, presuming 
nature must be set apart from any thought of God’s commitment to it.
While the Torah does not use the root ṭ-b-‘ to signify nature directly, 
it has other words to do that job. One is yetzer, one’s inclination, as in the 
bent (yetzer) of a man’s heart is evil from his youth (Genesis 8:21), reading 
8 See Exodus 17:2-17, Deuteronomy 6:16.
9 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 
p. 81. For philosophy in scripture, see Lenn E. Goodman, Judaism: A  Contemporary 
Philosophical Investigation, forthcoming.
10 Ilai Alon and S. Abed., Al-Farabi’s Philosophical Lexicon (Cambridge: Gibb Memorial 
Trust, 2008), 1.238, 2.655.
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nature in its familiar local sense, referring to the character of a thing or 
a person rather than cosmic constancy. But the Torah does broach its 
idea of nature from the outset, by contrasting God’s handiwork with the 
primordial tohu va-vohu. It carries the idea further when it tells of the 
sprouting herbage, the seed-bearing plants yielding fruit of their kind 
(Genesis 1:11), the sun and moon presiding over day and night (1:16), 
and living creatures reaching for transcendence by the avenue open to 
them, striving to be fruitful and multiply (1:20-25). The focus is on God’s 
creation of all these: You are Lord, You alone. You made the sky and the 
sky beyond the sky, and all their host, the earth and all that is upon it, the 
seas and all that they contain. You give life to them all, and all the host of 
heaven bow before you (Nehemiah 9:6).
God empowers living beings to perpetuate their kind, a  blessing 
directly spoken in the human case since the first couple receive not just 
the breath of life but also articulate speech (Genesis 1:28). Creation, is 
God’s act, but vitality, procreation, thought, and speech are gifts freely 
bestowed. In recognizing the diverse and fecund, swarming, flying, 
swimming, and creeping creatures, scripture defines nature ostensively, 
surveying God’s creatures and the nisus of their claims, making nature the 
backdrop of Israel’s history and mission and the anchor of its argument 
for God’s reality and act.
The Torah does not alienate God from his work. So God is typically 
said to act by way of his creations: Pharaoh and his people are afflicted 
by lice and boils, frogs and darkness, swarming creatures, cattle plagues, 
locusts and hail. The first and last plagues, the bloody waters and the 
slaying of the firstborn, have their impact, if not their origins, on the 
natures they affect. Only at the outset does God create from nothing.
Israel, trapped with their backs to the sea, crossed dryshod when the 
Lord drove back the sea with a  strong east wind all that night (Exodus 
14:21). Pharaoh pursues his departing slaves, after a natural change of 
heart (14:5). God shields Israel behind a dark cloud (14:19-20). When the 
people reach the far shore, the sea returned to its steady flow [aitano, its 
regular course – another way of citing nature; cf. Psalms 74:15] (14:27). It 
is the returning waters that allow the song of Moses to say that God cast 
Pharaoh’s chariotry and his host into the sea (15:4). The implements of all 
the miracles are natural.
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In Job, as Saadiah explains,11 nature is the theme of God’s speech from 
the stormwind. Again we hear of God’s laying earth’s foundations, but the 
imagery of sound design is followed up in allusions to the earth’s measure 
and cornerstone (38:6). God set limits to the reach of the waves (38:8-11; 
cf. Psalms 104:9). Snow and hail, torrents and thunderstorms, sprouting 
grass, frost, rain, and ice, serve at His command. God, not man, reins 
in the Pleiades or looses Orion. Rains fall on wastelands (38:22-31). For 
man is not the be-all and end-all of creation. God imparts reason (38:36) 
but also provides the lion its prey and feeds the ravens’ young (38:39). 
He knows the seasons of birth and gestation for deer and mountain goats 
(39:1-2) and gives the onager his freedom. For a wild ass would laugh at 
city throngs (39:5); a wild ox would hardly lodge at some farmer’s crib, 
or plough his furrow, or gather his seedcorn from the threshing floor 
(39:9-11). Nature is wild and free, overseen by God, whose mercies are 
on all his works (Psalms 145:9). The greatest land or water creatures are 
scarcely playthings to God (Job 40-41).
It was Hume who had a weak idea of nature. His dogmatic empiricism 
undermines the idea of an  inner regularity in things, leaving him no 
better case against miracles than his finding them unusual. That sets his 
brief against miracles on the same footing as his refusal to believe a Black 
man could be talented.12
11 Saadiah, The Book of Theodicy, tr. by L. E. Goodman (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1988), at Job 38 and 39, pp. 383-84, 393-94.
12 In 1753 Hume added a note to his essay, ‘Of National Characters’, maintaining ‘the 
negroes and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) 
to be naturally inferior to whites’. His evidence: ‘There never was a civilized nation of 
any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent in either action or 
speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no sciences. [...] Such a uniform 
and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages if nature had not 
made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, 
there are Negroe slaves dispersed all over Europe, of which none ever discovered any 
symptoms of ingenuity; tho’ low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and 
distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one negroe as 
a man of parts and learning; but ’tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, 
like a parrot, who speaks a few words very plainly.’ David Hume, The Philosophical Works, 
ed. by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London, 1882), 3.253. Criticized by James Beattie, 
an Aberdeen professor, for ignoring the civilizations of Mexico and Peru and failing to 
survey ‘all the negroes that now are or ever were on the face of the earth’ (An Essay on the 
Nature and Immutability of Truth in opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Edinburgh, 
1770), pp. 48–82), Hume revised his note for what proved the posthumous edition of his 
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Biblically there’s bound to be some tension between talk of miracles 
and thoughts of nature, with God its guarantor. The Talmudic Rabbis 
seek to ease the tension by imagining the prominent exceptions to 
nature’s regularity woven into its fabric from the start:
Ten things were created on the Sabbath eve at twilight: the mouth of 
the earth [that swallowed Koraḥ and his cohort (Numbers 16)], the 
mouth of the well [of Miriam13], the mouth of the she-ass [of Balaam 
(Numbers 22:28)], the rainbow (Genesis 9:13-17), the manna (Exodus 
16:14–26), Moses’ rod (Exodus 4:17, etc.), the Shamir [whose tracks 
cleaved the stones for Solomon’s temple, lest any iron tool desecrate it 
with even a suggestion of bloodshed (Exodus 20:22, 1 Kings 6:7)], the 
letters, writing, and tablets [of the Decalogue (Exodus 24:12)]. Some say, 
imps too, Moses’ grave [prepared by God (Deuteronomy 34:6)], the ram 
of Abraham (Genesis 22:13). And some say, the tongs made with tongs. 
(Mishnah Avot 5.8)
The first tongs, mentioned, as if in an  afterthought, stand for the 
difficulties inherent in the emergence of higher from simpler things: How 
were tongs made without tongs to handle them at the forge? If nothing 
comes from nothing, how can the greater emerge from the less? Theism, 
along with Plato’s thesis as to the primacy of absolute over relative value 
writings, 1777, deleting his general reference to non-white races and with it the word 
‘species’, with its overtones of polygenism, thus focusing his diatribe more sharply on 
Blacks and bypassing Beattie’s countercases. Hume had let the offensive note stand in 
all editions of his essay down to and including that of 1770, when Beattie’s criticism 
appeared. Henry Louis Gates identifies Hume’s ‘man of parts’ as Francis Williams, 
a  Cambridge graduate and teacher of Latin and mathematics, who also published 
poetry in Latin. Hume ignored Williams’ public protest of his parrot remark, leading 
Richard Popkin to call Hume a  ‘lousy empirical scientist’ and a  ‘dishonest researcher’, 
for failing to acknowledge ‘the facts that disproved his claim’. Richard Popkin, ‘Hume’s 
Racism Reconsidered’, in The Third Force in Seventeenth-Century Thought (Leiden: Brill, 
1992), pp. 64-75. See John Immerwahr, ‘Hume’s Revised Racism’, Journal of the History 
of Ideas, 53 (1992), 481-86. Hume did not confine his prejudice to blacks. Writing from 
Izmir in 1748, he declared, ‘The ingenuity, industry, and activity of the ancient Greeks 
have nothing in common with the stupidity and indolence of the present inhabitants 
of those regions.’ What matters here is that Hume allowed himself to generalize on the 
basis of slight and narrow experience and to transform his generalization about a race 
(or congeries of races) into a pronouncement about what was possible for all of those he 
felt licensed to despise.
13 Immediately after Miriam’s death we read: there was no water for the community 
(see Exodus 20:1-2). The Sages infer that while Miriam lived a miraculous well followed 
the Israelites during their wanderings.
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(and thus the possibility of emanation as well as creation), depends on 
a coherent answer to that question.
The letters of the Decalogue and substance of the tablets on which 
a  supernal God might inscribe his teachings again raise questions of 
causal and ontic primacy, and God’s creative role. Aristotle touches the 
question when he speaks of the role of the Active Intellect:
... one does not decide to decide, which would presuppose some prior 
decision. There must be a starting point. Nor does one think after first 
thinking one will think, and so ad infinitum. So thought does not 
originate from thinking, nor a  decision from a  prior decision. What, 
then, could be the starting point but chance? So everything would start 
from chance? But perhaps there is a starting point with none before it, 
that can act just by being what it is. That is what we are looking for, the 
origin of movement in the soul. The answer is clear: In the soul as in 
the universe, all is moved by God. For in a way the divine within us is 
what moves everything. Reasoning begins not from reasoning but from 
something greater. And what could be greater than mind and knowing 
but God? (Eudemian Ethics VIII 1248a18-29).
If we hope to wrestle with what it means to speak of God’s act in nature 
and the mystery of the nexus of the Transcendent to the here and now 
in ourselves or in the cosmos, we must address such questions about the 
priority of the Infinite to the finite. But consider first the other things 
created in the twilight of the sixth day.
None of them, plainly, sprung from nature’s familiar order. Yet neither 
did they breach God’s plan. All ten served Israel’s welfare and mission. 
Built into nature’s fabric, they underscore the subtext of the numerous 
liturgical blessings that acknowledge God’s grace in ‘sanctifying us with 
His commandments’. What that subtext pronounces is the thought 
that the Torah reveals concretely what the Supernal wills for us. Israel’s 
destiny is woven into nature’s fabric: The warp of history unfolds in 
natural events; the weft is added by our individual and communal acts 
and choices. Unlike the threads spun and cut by Hesiod’s fates, these 
do not preempt our opportunities to act. Hence the irony of Esther’s 
Scroll: Haman’s lots fell out as they would, but history reversed his plans. 
The outcome arose not simply from God’s judgment but from Esther’s 
choice. Plato, similarly, gives freedom its say, putting into the mouth of 
Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity, the speech that countermands her 
ancient, fatalistic role:
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No divinity shall cast lots for you. You shall choose your own deity. Let 
him to whom falls the first lot first select a life to which he must cleave. 
But virtue has no master over her; each shall have more or less of her 
as he honours or despites her. The blame is his who chooses. God is 
blameless. (Republic X 617e)
Like Plato, Maimonides holds God above reproach (cf. Deuteronomy 
32:4-5). Like Heraclitus he finds the key to destiny in character, not the 
stars. His God, like Plato’s, is above change as well as above reproach. 
Reading the list of things created in the twilight of the sixth day, 
Maimonides says of the Sages, ‘they did not believe that God changes 
his mind. At the outset of creation He set into nature those things by 
which all would be done that would be done’. God used and augmented 
the natural powers of things. ‘Outcomes that were frequent were natural; 
those that were extraordinary, reserved for a remote future, were marvels. 
But all were alike.’14 All expressed the natures God imparted.
Maimonides outdoes the ancient rabbis in naturalizing miracles, 
weaving yet more tightly into nature’s fabric marvels not listed as created 
in the twilight of the first Sabbath: The parting of the waters for Israel 
(Exodus 14:21) and Joshua (Joshua 3:13-17),15 the natures that made 
possible the miracles of Elijah (1 Kings 17-19) and Elisha (2 Kings 4-7), 
the halting of the sun and moon at Gibeon (Joshua 10:13), and every 
other scriptural miracle.
The occasionalists of the kalam devised a different strategy. Rather 
than naturalize miracles, they made every event an  act of God. Since 
nothing can do or be more than God pleases, nothing can outlast its 
instant or exceed its place. Beings were atoms. Each had a position but 
no lasting duration, no size, and no causal power. All power belongs to 
God (Qur’ān 18:39).
The notion of dimensionless atoms was pilloried by Avicenna for the 
geometrical paradoxes it entrained. Even earlier, al-Ash‘arī, within the 
Islamic kalām, had seen the difficulties for perceptual realism entailed 
by denying natural causality. Maimonides sharply criticized the kalām 
occasionalists for erasing the very idea of nature and undermining God’s 
role as Creator of a coherent cosmos. Why, he asked, would God create 
things no one needs if, say, food does not sustain us and medicines 
14 Maimonides’ Commentary Mishnah Avot, at 5.6.
15 Y. Tzvi Langermann, ‘Maimonides and Miracles’, Jewish History, 18 (2004), 147-172 
(p. 151).
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cannot treat our illnesses? On the contrary, God’s providence, working 
through nature, grants resources in proportion to our need – air most 
abundantly, then water, then simple, wholesome foods. Nature, by God’s 
grace, provides mother’s milk for babes until they’re ready for solid 
food. God, through nature, lets some life forms depend on others, as 
all animals depend ultimately on plants. The Psalmist (104) sweepingly 
alludes to all four elements  – wind and fire, earth and sea  – as God’s 
instrumentalities (Guide II 6). God loses nothing by empowering natural 
things, and it does not diminish his sway to delegate human powers of 
free choice. Langermann finds Maimonides warmer toward miracles in 
his later works. Yet, at no time, he stresses, did Maimonides surrender 
his belief in nature’s causal continuity. From his youth, ‘the regularity of 
natural events’ was for him ‘the greatest proof ’ of God’s rule.16
God’s covenant found confirmation, Maimonides holds, not in 
miracles but in its content (cf. Deuteronomy 18:15-25).17 Indeed, 
Maimonides found the strongest ground for loyalty to that covenant, 
as he states in writing to the beleaguered Jews of Yemen, neither in the 
natural order nor in miracles but in the giving of the Law. That theophany 
was normative. The Torah’s bestowal did not disrupt the laws of nature 
but touched the minds of all: God reached out, and Israel responded by 
reaching up toward Him.18
That thought captures a second strategy of Maimonides’ for naturali-
zing miracles, perhaps more welcome than the midrashic twilight to 
those who share Maimonides’ belief that causal regularity is the surest 
sign of God’s rule. All the movements of Balaam’s ass, he argues, were 
brought about by an angel (Guide I 6). But in Maimonides’ voluntaristic 
version of neoplatonism, angels are the forms and forces God imparts, 
allowing things to act.19 They are the natures of things. But later in the 
Guide (II 42) Maimonides locates Balaam’s conversation with his she-ass 
in a prophetic vision. Likewise Jacob’s wrestling match (Genesis 32:25-33) 
16 Langermann, ‘Maimonides and Miracles’, p. 148.
17 Maimonides, Epistle to Yemen, tr. by Abraham Halkin, in Crisis and Leadership: 
Epistles of Maimonides (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1985), p. 113.
18 Maimonides, Epistle to Yemen, tr. by Halkin, in Crisis and Leadership, p. 104; Guide 
I 54, 63, III 6, ‘Eight Chapters’, citing Mekhilta to Exodus 15:2.
19 See Lenn E. Goodman, Maimonidean Naturalism in Neoplatonism and Jewish 
Thought, edited by L. E. Goodman (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), pp.  139-72, and in 
Maimonides and the Sciences, edited by Robert Cohen and Hillel Levine (Boston: Kluwer, 
2000), pp. 57-85.
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and Joshua’s encounter with an  angel (Joshua 5:13-15). Generalizing, 
Maimonides writes: ‘Do not imagine for a moment that an angel can be 
seen or heard to speak unless in the dreams and visions of prophecy, as 
the principle is clearly stated: in a vision do I make myself known to him, 
in a dream do I speak to him (Numbers 12:6).’
Even as he presses that universal thesis, Maimonides stresses the 
reality of angels as God’s intermediaries: Subjectivity need not entail 
unreality. The mind is the meeting place of the finite with the Infinite. 
God governs nature through minds, celestial or human. So bracketing the 
miraculous within the realm of experience need not mean its dismissal. 
And the experience, as Sinai reveals, need not be private.
Bible scholars tell us that poetry like the Song at the Sea antedates 
its prose settings, which relate an  ancient living experience to a  later 
moment. Hence the opening word (az, then) of the verse introducing 
Moses’ song: Then did Moses and the Children of Israel sing this song to the 
Lord: (Exodus 15:1). God’s fighting for the Israelites, so recently slaves 
whose children were cast into the Nile and whose taskmasters expected 
to beat them with impunity, belongs to their experience: The tide turned, 
Egypt’s chariotry sank like a  stone, like lead in the mighty waters, the 
sea seemed to part, its waters to stand up like walls as Israel passed.20 
No Israelite heard the foe promising themselves booty. But the people, 
singing joyously, could taste the irony of Egypt’s defeat as God’s breath 
sent back the sea. The shared epiphany was captured in the poet’s words – 
just as Deborah’s song seizes its moment, picturing Sisera’s mother at 
her lattice, reassured by her tactful ladies that only the rich booty can 
have detained the brigands’ chariots; then the perspective shifts from the 
uneasy reassurance of the ladies awaiting the ravished Israelite women 
(Judges 5:30) to Israel’s realization that the roads are safe (cf. 5:6-7), and 
the prose historian’s verdict: the land had peace for forty years (5:31).
A  shared moment is again captured when Joshua orders sun and 
moon to halt while he completes the enemy’s rout – the poet’s words, 
preserved from the vanished Book of Jashar (Joshua 10:12-13). The stars 
did not literally battle Sisera, but the triumph was no less real for that – 
and no less real in the Six Day War, or at Entebbe in the year of America’s 
20  The midrash tellingly calls the Sea of Reeds a  swamp. See Mekhilta Shirata at 
Exodus 15:5, tr. by Judah Goldin in The Song at the Sea (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1971), p. 139. Much depended on perception: Israel felt trapped by the sea before 
the tide turned – the tide of the sea, and the tide of trust. The waters that had seemed 
an impassable barrier were soon to engulf Pharaoh’s chariotry.
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bicentennial. Each generation has its triumphs and visions. If the cause 
is just, there is no blasphemy in seeing the work and hand of God. The 
clearest shared theophany for Israel was the moment when all stood 
before God at Sinai and, according to their capacity, experienced the 
commanding Reality inviting each to rise in emulation of God’s holiness 
by following the Law that articulates Israel’s way of life. The moment was 
no messy ecstasy but a gateway. Midrashically, every future generation 
was present; liturgically, later generations relive the moment, rising to 
hear the Decalogue read out from the Torah scroll.
It’s natural, not least in times of crisis for outstanding characters to be 
adorned in popular imagination or sacred history with tales of marvels 
like those that decorate the memory of Elisha or Elijah, or the latest 
wunder-rebbe, giving charisma its glister. But greatness needs no tinsel. 
Little clings to the real Lincoln or Gandhi. The Church can routinize 
the awe by requiring documented miracles of its saints, an expectation 
Anselm tried to duck, more focused on God’s epiphany to the mind than 
on the laying on of healing hands. For Israel the epiphanies that matter 
most are experiential, yet shared: The biblical miracles of Moses relate 
more to his people than his person – to Israel’s sense of providence and 
chosenness for a  mission. Even the heaviest midrashic embellishment 
cannot overwrite the events or disable with credulity or incredulity the 
meanings we naturally seek and find in historic patterns. Human beings 
are meaning makers, but our penchant to connect the dots does not 
make every construct as good as any other, as though life and experience 
were a duck-rabbit whose chief message was its own ambiguity.
Natural miracles are distinguished less by their rarity than by their 
reception. Yet events can have a  real significance. Most tellingly, the 
very existence and dynamic of beings, as I’ve long argued, sets real value 
before us. The fact of life, or the existence of anything at all, come closest 
to what I call a miracle, not for rarity, or even improbability, but for the 
natural marvel. Scientists as well as poets see these things – and moderns 
see nothing different from what the ancients saw – although scientists 
today may be as reticent as Mordecai in naming them. The rainbow is 
a sign, not in spite of optics, but by its beauty. Diverse interests may lay 
claim to its meaning. But that cannot make one construal no better than 
an other.
In Israel’s case the memory of Egypt is made a moral imperative, from 
God’s mouth, to love the stranger, since we were strangers (Deuteronomy 
10:19). That memory, so construed, defines a  sense of destiny and 
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a  mission chosen. How unlike Geworfenheit! Its moral truth seconds 
its historical verisimilitude. Vengeance was not the message taken. If 
Israel has long been the suffering servant, as Isaiah saw,21 there is no less 
truth in her glimpses of herself in memory as God’s once youthful bride 
and lover, sometimes bereft but never divorced or forsaken. Jeremiah 
recounts God’s words: I remember you for your youthful grace, your love 
as a  bride, how you followed Me in the desert, a  land unsown...(2:2).22 
The prophets, seeing God’s hand in Israel’s sufferings, can honestly claim 
a license to see the same hand in her triumphs.
There’s both power and weakness in construing all that occurs as 
meaningful for oneself, or one’s people. The moral use made of such 
a construal helps draw the line, but so does our command of science, 
general and human. Henchard’s last delusion in The Mayor of Casterbridge 
is his conviction that fate has conspired against him. There’s a  similar 
mingling of self-pity and self-congratulation in the existentialists’ idea of 
life’s absurdity, and its mirror image in their notion that warm embrace 
of any choice can make the choice right – much like the moral solipsism 
of the egoist who casts himself as the hero of the piece and takes every 
person, thing, and event he meets as stage business, props and settings 
meant to show off his own acts and passions.
Knowing one’s place in nature is the real start of wisdom, pointed 
to in the Delphic admonition to self-knowledge, the maxim as it stood 
before Plato inverted it by portraying Socrates as finding there a hidden 
hint of the divinity of the self. The ancient maxim was a counsel of piety 
that links hands with the admonition of the Psalms: Piety is the start 
of wisdom (111:10). Piety counsels modesty, and modesty knows that 
21 See Lenn E. Goodman, On Justice, p. 168.
22 In the liturgy of the Day of Atonement these words of Jeremiah’s recur repeatedly. 
Rashi introduces his commentary on the Song of Songs: ‘Through the Holy Spirit 
Solomon saw that Israel would be exiled time and again and suffer desolation upon 
desolation, taunted in exile with her former glory. Recalling the early love that once 
favored them above all nations, they would say, I will return to my first husband. It was 
better for me then than now (Hosea 2:9). They would remember his love, how faithless 
they had been (Leviticus 26:40), and the favors he had promised them in the end. So he 
wrote this book, inspired by the Holy Spirit, in the voice of a woman, bereft and forlorn, 
yearning for her husband, longing for her sweetheart, recalling her young love of him, 
and confessing her wrongs. But her lover suffers with her (cf. Isaiah 63:9), remembering 
her youthful grace, her charms, and the fair actions that bound him to her in love in days 
past. He never meant to make her suffer (cf. Jeremiah 3:33). She was never divorced, He 
says, but was still his wife, and He her husband (cf. Isaiah 50:1, Hosea 2:4). He will yet 
return to her.’
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others too have needs and projects, that they as well as we live in a natural 
world where all things exercise a conatus that may affect or concern us 
but hardly turns exclusively to serve or thwart our interests. Plato was 
right, of course – up to a point. There is a bit of God in us, breathed into 
our bodies in the breath of life and light of consciousness. That’s why 
Mordecai and Esther were able to act, to hear the still small voice, and 
take their people with them.
Piety is not reticence or abdication. Mordecai might have held his 
peace and told himself that nothing could be done. He might have 
convinced himself that speaking out would only make things worse. 
Isaiah Berlin, a brilliant man and beloved teacher, chose tragic silence 
(as he would confess) when his British masters held him back. He spoke 
out later, courageously, against communism. But he saw no way to do 
what Jan Karski or Raphael Lemkin did before Nazism had borne its 
full measure of dark and ugly fruit. And many others, close to FDR, the 
Ahasuerus of our times, allowed themselves to be silenced, fearing loss 
of face or influence, while six million died. Not so Natan Sharansky in 
the Soviet case, or Avi Weiss. Their words and acts reached the ears of 
Scoop Jackson and other Senators and rescued millions of their people 
from the Soviet bear’s paws.
It took no praeternatural powers for Theodore Herzl to foresee the 
denouement for European Jewry – only intellectual honesty and moral 
courage, refusal to hide from the facts or from his own flesh. Lemkin 
could document the nisus of Axis legislation in the occupied lands. Even 
before he coined the term he knew the stench of genocide. Herzl did 
not live to see the State of Israel, any more than Moses lived to enter 
the Land. But Herzl’s 54 years were long enough to launch the Zionist 
movement that would build the state. As for Avi Weiss and Natan 
Sharansky, they lived to see the Soviet empire collapse, and both still 
speak out for truth, which in the lexicon of Judaism is synonymous with 
justice. Even Lemkin, in just 59 years, lived to see the fall of the Reich 
to last a  thousand years and served as father, mother, and midwife in 
making the United Nations pay at least lip service to his judicial vision 
branding genocide a crime.
Returning, as promised, to the primacy of the actual and precedence 
of the Infinite, from which the finite springs. Emergence is the theme I’d 
like to close on, a cosmic rather than local truth. For part of what makes 
one reading of events more credible (and saner) than another is fitting 
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together the facets of experience into a  coherent whole.23 That’s the 
standard science uses, and theists too should use it when they speak of 
God’s governance or of creation, not reserving separate epistemologies 
for one day of the week.
Natural miracles are not alien to the work of science. I’ll focus on two 
special cases of emergence here, one sheathed within the other: the work 
of evolution, and the rise of souls and minds.24 I see evolution as evidence 
for theism, given the localization of value in the history of every species. 
In the same light, the emergence of mind and soul from their biological 
roots points to God’s work in nature. For there is a  directionality to 
evolution in the groping (as Teilhard put it) of the lineages of life toward 
the light – that is, toward self direction. That arrow points toward God. 
We can see it whether we look upward from our lab benches and writing 
desks or vault upwards, as the prophets do, and try to see things from 
God’s universal standpoint.
We face an  objection here, not so much to the fact of evolution, 
which has become all but sacred doctrine in most educated circles, but 
perhaps to emergence, and almost certainly (surprisingly enough) to 
consciousness, which might have been thought (and has been thought) 
the most salient fact we know. The present essay is hardly the ideal place 
to vindicate as fully as they deserve the claims I’ve made here, no more 
than naming the chief instances of what I take to be God’s special actions 
vis a vis the world in which we live. Each of these claims is such that many 
books could be devoted to it, and have been. Several of those books are 
mine. But I’ll try, at least, to suggest the arguments they broach at far 
greater length than is possible or appropriate here – and hope to whet the 
reader’s appetite for a fuller exposition.
(1) I’ve suggested that God acts in there being something rather 
than nothing. It’s true, as Hume proposes, that there’s no necessity in 
seeking an absolute cause for all contingency. But I caution, as I did in 
God of Abraham, that there’s a price to pay in abandoning the search for 
an ultimate beyond all conditioned causes: The quest for understanding 
breaks down, and science is emptied of content if all things are explained 
in terms of one another or in terms of something else that’s left without 
23 See Lenn E. Goodman, In Defense of Truth: A Pluralistic Approach (Amherst, NY: 
Humanity Books, 2001), Chapter 5.
24 See Lenn E. Goodman, Creation and Evolution and Lenn E. Goodman and D. G. 
Caramenico, Coming to Mind: The Soul and its Body (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2013).
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an explanation. In such a case the wholesome impulse of inquiry ends 
in circularity or in an infinite regress; the promise of understanding that 
prompted inquiry deadends, leaving nothing in the end explained – for 
A is explained in terms of B, and B in terms of C, but N, on which the 
entire chain depends, is left unexplained, being simply brought back to 
A or some combination of those earlier terms, if it is not left a surd, and 
the hope of understanding pinned to the wall by positivism.
(2) I’ve read evolution theistically. That’s not an  inevitable or even 
a very familiar reading. But biological evolution calls to our attention 
the local goods that organisms pursue in their myriad ways – not just for 
the immediate individual but for its kind and lineage. The purposiveness 
we see in evolution – easily denied or overlooked, since it’s hardly our 
purposes that life at large pursues – is redolent of the goods that drive 
or draw organic nature, inviting us to reconsider another kind of causal 
sequence and another kind of causal ultimacy alongside the causality 
of mechanism, which so typically is pressed into its service in the living 
world. It’s the telic kind of causality and ultimacy that inspired both 
biblical and classical thinkers to read the dynamism of nature in theistic 
terms. I have much more to say about evolutionary theism in Creation 
and Evolution. So I  commend that Darwinian book to readers who 
would like to see that argument articulated more fully, or who simply 
would like to see why theism and neodarwinism are not conceptually the 
foes they’ve been cracked up to be.
(3) I’ve called biological evolution a  special case of emergence in 
a broad sense, the kind known in the history of stars, and throughout 
the cosmos. Emergence of that kind, I  think, reveals the dynamism 
(rather than inertness) of matter. I’ve also called the rise of consciousness 
a  special case of biological evolution. Many philosophers have treated 
consciousness as a  mystery. But that outlook, I  suspect, reflects the 
difficulty they find in reducing mind to mechanism.25 If one thinks 
25  There’s a  rich array of alternatives to mechanist accounts of consciousness 
represented in The Waning of Materialism, edited by Robert C. Coons and George 
Bealer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). To single out just one paper from that 
symposium, William Hasker notes the enduring good sense of Leibniz’s celebrated 
windmill argument: Enlarging a  putative thinking/perceiving machine to the scale 
of a  windmill, inside which one could walk about, would still show us nothing more 
than ‘parts pushing one another’. Nothing would reveal the (subjective) essence of 
perception  – let alone other dimensions of consciousness. (I  find it telling Leibniz is 
the author of this argument since he devised the second generation of computer after 
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explanation must mean reduction of complexes to their parts and 
outcomes to their origins, it’s clear that consciousness, autonomy, choice, 
human agency, and creativity will never be understood – any more than 
we can explain the chemistry or taste of salt by delineating the properties 
of its elements, sodium and chlorine. Something new has happened here 
that goes beyond the properties of the elements. Any cook or chemist 
knows about such things. Indeed, to make sense of the chemist’s critical 
distinction between mixtures and compounds, demands dealing with 
the notion of emergence – not abandoning reduction, but scuttling the 
dogma of reductionism.
Souls, as Greg Caramenico and I argued in Coming to Mind, do things 
quite impossible for the chemical constituents of the bodies in which they 
emerge. Souls, we argue, are not auras or wisps of smoke – or anything 
quasi-physical. The terms that properly describe their action are not the 
same as those describing the matter underlying their capabilities. The 
notional separability of consciousness from human behaviour that once 
inspired Descartes to set the soul (alarmingly) apart from nature has since 
been pled in some quarters to warrant claims that one’s consciousness 
might be downloaded into a (powerful enough) computer, or to argue 
that there’s no a priori reason why zombies might not walk the earth, 
indistinguishable from humans, but utterly without consciousness. But 
notional separability, I would argue, is a far cry from natural separation. 
I  suspect that the intimacy and intricacy of our embodiment renders 
souls inseparable from their bodies. What matters for our present 
interest is that souls do emerge in bodies like our own – developmentally 
as we grow and learn, and phylogenetically in the course of evolution. 
The rise of souls and consciousness is not proof of divine action. But it is 
evidence, taking its place alongside nature’s constancy and continuity, as 
an expression of divine love.
The human mind, I’ve intimated, is the meeting place of finitude with 
the Infinite. We can see that pretty clearly if we ask ourselves about the 
human capacity to conceive infinity – conceive and not imagine. Descartes 
illustrates the difference by pointing out that we readily conceive the 
difference between a  chiliagon and a  myriagon, although imagination 
Pascal’s adding machine  – and reflected seriously about a  mechanism that could be 
made to perform conceptual analysis using a  specially devised binary symbol system. 
With arguments like Leibniz’s in mind, Hasker commends a strong form of substance 
emergentism comparable to the position argued for in Coming to Mind.
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merely blurs the two. Similarly, we readily conceive a  circle, although 
we have trouble imagining a perfect one. From one perspective, a circle 
is a polygon of infinite sides and angles. In saying so we acknowledge at 
least one fact about the infinite. Mathematicians, as we know, routinely 
work with quantities thought of as extended to infinity. A  keen and 
creative mathematician like Georg Cantor conceived diverse orders of 
infinity, with demonstrable quantitative relations. Today we find a new 
sense in Nehemiah’s words about the sky beyond the sky. To reach for 
God’s infinity conceptually is more demanding than just to picture some 
vast expanse. When we speak of God, we’re speaking of Perfection, and 
we must guard against tainting our ideas of that perfection with any 
tincture of our human limitations. But we reach in God’s direction when 
we think of infinite goodness, wisdom, and uncompromised Reality.
If we ask ourselves the old midrashic question about the matter on 
which God’s precepts might be written, it’s pretty clear today that it 
would be the human brain, the organ of the soul. A product of evolution, 
but open to experience and groundwork of what we have that makes 
us capable of creativity and caring, each human brain builds as many 
synaptic connections as there are elementary particles in the universe. 
How a brain could arise from simpler matter, and how consciousness, 
memory, agency, perception, and creativity could emerge from the 
brains of persons are questions that our sciences address in promising 
and fruitful ways.26 But the risk is everpresent, when we tell such stories, 
that reductionism will erase what it professed to explain. Darwin made 
no such error. He did not, in discovering how one species arises from 
another, erase the explanandum, or its differentiae, leaving explanation 
with nothing to explain.
The mind, we say, is made possible by the brain. That much was 
known to Galen, although we know much more now about just how that 
possibility must work. But we need to remain careful not to forget that 
the mind is not the brain, any more than human beings are apes, or apes 
are mere machines or chemicals. Consciousness makes us subjects, not 
mere objects. The fact of consciousness is rife with moral, aesthetic, and 
26 Worth reading here: William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1999); Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Gerald M. Edelman, Wider than the Sky: 
The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Evan 
Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007).
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spiritual implications. Spirit is part of the human story, whether it shapes 
a quest for God or pursues artistic, scientific, or intellectual purposes, or 
simply struggles to stay alive and preserve one’s loved ones, or humanity, 
or nature. Reason is our guardian angel here. Analysis breaks things 
down conceptually. But it need not destroy them. Synthesis can relate 
things to one another and see a larger whole. So long as a reductionist 
bias has not denatured our understanding we will recognize an up and 
a down to complexity – and to value. Knowing up from down can help 
orient us toward God’s work in nature, if we allow ourselves to look. The 
upward path faces the divine. But so, in a way, does the downward. For 
God’s work is all around us waiting to be discovered.
